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Abstract
We study the effect of observability on the noncontractible investment of a regulated firm
with private marginal cost information. We show that the observability reduces investment,
pointing to the regulated firm’s prevention of ratcheting. This result, which is in line with
an earlier finding of Tirole (1986) obtained in a bargaining model of procurement with
two-sided asymmetric information, reveals that ‘underinvestment due to observability’ is
independent of whether only the investing firm or all of the parties affected by its investment
decision have some private information.
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1 Introduction
A pioneering work of Tirole (1986) showed that the noncontractible investment of a
firm is lower when it is observable than when it is not. This finding was obtained in a
two-period procurement model where a single project is produced and sold by a single
firm to a single sponsor. The firm, in the first period, invests in reducing the costs
of the project. At the beginning of the second period, the sponsor learns its private
value for the project while the firm privately learns the costs it will face if it realizes
the project. Then takes place a noncooperative bargaining where the firm and the
sponsor determine whether to trade and the price contingent on trade. According
to Tirole (1986), why observability leads to underinvestment in this model can be
explained by the so called ‘information effect’, which only arises when investment
is observable since in that case the firm can not only influence its cost distribution
but also the sponsor’s beliefs about it. As the sponsor’s price under observability
decreases with the sponsor’s beliefs about the firm’s investment, more optimistic
beliefs make the sponsor less agreeable in the bargaining process in the second period,
leading the firm to reduce its investment below the level it would choose under
unobservability.
One may here ask whether or not Tirole’s (1986) result of underinvestment due
to observability is sensitive to his modelling assumption that both the firm and
the sponsor have some private information about the project and can thus make
a noncooperative bargaining for trade. To answer this question, we will study in
this paper whether observability affects the noncontractible investment decision of a
regulated firm in a principal-agent model where ‘only’ the agent, i.e. the investing
firm, holds some private information about the regulated environment.
While our research question is novel to the best of our knowledge, investment of
a firm in a principal-agent framework has been extensively studied in the regulation
literature, where the closest works to our study are Baron and Besanko (1984) and
Laffont and Tirole (1993). Both of these works consider the case of unobservable and
noncontractible investment as well as the case of observable and contractible invest-
ment. However, neither of them studies the case of observable and noncontractible
investment, which as mentioned by Laffont and Tirole (1993, p. 88) may arise as a
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third possibility when “The regulator might observe investment but not be able to
provide evidence that is accurate enough for a court in charge of enforcing the regu-
latory contract.” Our paper will attempt to consider this unexplored case together
with the earlier studied case of unobservable and noncontractible investment so as to
identify the effect of observability on noncontractible investment in a principal-agent
model with ‘one-sided’ informational asymmetry.
For tractability of our results, we will consider a simpler model than the models
considered by Baron and Besanko (1984) and Laffont and Tirole (1993). Basically, we
will integrate investment with Baron and Myerson’s (B-M) (1982) well-known model
that optimally regulates -through an incentive-compatible policy- a monopolist with
unknown production costs.1 In more detail, we will consider prior to the production
stage in the B-M model an investment stage in which the monopolist has access
to an investment (or research and development) technology determined by a fixed
parameter γ ∈ (0, 1) and a choice variable ρ ∈ [0, 1). This technology will reduce the
monopolist’s private marginal cost, say θ, to γθ with probability ρ. The parameter
γ will be called the improvement due to (successful) investment. On the other hand,
the variable ρ will be determined by the level of investment, and will be called the
probability of success or the level of investment interchangeably. We will close the
model by defining a cost function for investment.
For the model we have described above, we will assume that the regulator can not
contract on investment, implying that the value of the parameter ρ will be freely de-
termined by the monopolist. However, as in the B-M model without investment, the
regulator will be able to contract on the price and output of the product. Regarding
the regulator’s knowledge about investment, we will consider two possibilities: The
first one is that the regulator is ex-ante aware of the investment technology accessed
by the monopolist and is ex-post able to observe investment (say through mandated
reporting and auditing); i.e., she learns about the investment technology (γ, ρ) and
the actual value of the parameter γ before investment takes place, and observes the
1Thus, unlike Baron and Besanko (1984) we will consider a single-period model, and unlike
Laffont and Tirole (1993) we will assume away any (managerial) efforts for cost reduction after the
investment stage.
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actual value of the parameter ρ after investment takes place.2 The second possibil-
ity is that the regulator is never aware of the investment technology (γ, ρ) and she
never observes γ or ρ. We will study these two possibilities respectively in Section
3.1 and Section 3.2, after presenting our model in Section 2. In Section 3.3 we will
compare the optimal investment decisions calculated in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, yielding
our main result that a regulated monopolist invests less (more) when investment is
observable (unobservable). Furthermore, in Section 3.4 we will show that in situa-
tions where the social welfare attaches a sufficiently high weight to the monopolist
welfare, the unobservable investment of a regulated monopolist is even higher than
the investment of an unregulated monopolist. Finally, we will conclude in Section 4.
2 Model
We will first present our model without investment, which is a slightly simplified ver-
sion of the regulation model of B-M. Consider a monopolist facing the cost function
C(q, θ) = K + θq if q > 0, and C(0, θ) = 0, (1)
where K ≥ 0 denotes the fixed cost of producing any positive quantity of output and
θ denotes the privately known marginal cost lying in the interval (0, θ1], with θ1 > 0.
The demand faced by the monopolist at the price p is denoted by D(p) and satisfies
D(p) = D0 −D1p, for all p ∈ [0, D0/D1], (2)
2The assumption that the regulator is ex-ante informed about the improvement level of invest-
ment, or relatedly the parameter γ, will simplify our research problem quite a lot. In situations this
assumption does not hold, the regulated firm would “..., recognize that any investment it may make
to increase its efficiency will result in the regulator seeking information about its post-investment
cost structure in order to establish prices appropriate for the new level of efficiency. The manner
in which the regulator is expected to use the information to be obtained in the future thus affects
the firm’s incentive to make efficiency-enhancing investments and hence creates a moral hazard
problem.” [Baron and Besanko (1984, p. 268).]
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where D0, D1 > 0 and D(θ1) > 0.
3 We restrict ourselves to this simple form of
demand to analyze, in Section 3, the effect of demand shocks (or changes in the
maximal size of demand, D0) on the optimal level of investment. Formally, we say
that there is a demand shock to the monopolist (possibly caused by a change in
consumers’ income or taste) if D0 changes.
Given the demand function D, the total value to consumers of an output of
quantity q is
V (q) =
∫ q
0
D−1(x)dx, (3)
and the consumer surplus is V (q)−D−1(q)q.
The price and quantity in the monopolistic market will be determined by a regu-
latory authority. While the regulator does not know the actual value of the marginal
cost of the monopolist, she has prior beliefs about it, represented by the density func-
tion f , which is positive and continuous over its support (0, θ1]. Correspondingly,
F denotes the cumulative distribution function. It is assumed that the only infor-
mational asymmetry in the above model is about θ; everything else is symmetrically
known.
2.1 Regulatory Policy of B-M
The class of regulatory policies considered by B-M for the above-described monop-
olistic market (with no investment possibility) involves outcome functions 〈r, p, q, s〉
that will be characterized below. Announcing these four functions, the regulator asks
the monopolist to report its marginal cost parameter. If the monopolist reports θ˜ as
its marginal cost, r(θ˜) is the probability that it is allowed to sell, p(θ˜) and q(θ˜) are
the regulated price and quantity of the product respectively, and s(θ˜) is the expected
value of the subsidy the monopolist will receive conditional on the probability that
it is allowed to sell. Then, the expected profit of the monopolist, when it reports θ˜
3We also assume for convenience that the parameters D0 and D1 are such that demand is always
nonnegative at all regulated prices in Section 2 and Section 3.
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as its marginal cost while it is actually θ, can be written as
pi(θ˜, θ) =
[
p(θ˜)q(θ˜)− C(q(θ˜), θ)
]
r(θ˜) + s(θ˜). (4)
A regulatory policy 〈r, p, q, s〉 is called feasible if it satisfies the following condi-
tions for all θ ∈ (0, θ1]:
(i) r(θ) is a probability function, i.e.,
0 ≤ r(θ) ≤ 1, (5)
(ii) p(θ) and q(θ) are consistent with each other on the demand curve, i.e.,
q(θ) = D(p(θ)), (6)
(iii) the regulatory policy is incentive-compatible (truthful revelation is optimal) for
the monopolist, i.e.,
pi(θ, θ) ≥ pi(θ˜, θ), for all θ˜ ∈ (0, θ1], (7)
(iv) the regulatory policy is individually rational for the monopolist under truthful
revelation, i.e.,
pi(θ, θ) ≥ 0. (8)
Now, consider any θ ∈ (0, θ1]. Given a feasible regulatory policy 〈r, p, q, s〉, the
consumer welfare (consumer surplus net of the subsidy paid to the monopolist) and
the producer welfare (operational profit plus subsidy paid by consumers) become
CW (θ) = [V (q(θ))− p(θ)q(θ)] r(θ)− s(θ), (9)
and
pi(θ) ≡ pi(θ, θ) = [p(θ)q(θ)− C(q(θ), θ)] r(θ) + s(θ), (10)
respectively. The social welfare SW (θ) is defined to be a weighted average of con-
sumer welfare CW (θ) and the producer welfare pi(θ). Formally,
SW (θ) = CW (θ) + αpi(θ)
= [V (q(θ))− C(q(θ), θ))] r(θ)− (1− α) pi(θ), (11)
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where α ∈ [0, 1] is the weight parameter.
The problem of the regulator, who is uninformed about θ, is to choose a feasible
regulatory policy that will lead to the highest expected value of SW (θ) in (11),
conditional on her prior beliefs about θ. Formally, the regulator’s objective is to find
optimal policy functions that will solve
max
r(.),p(.),q(.),s(.)
∫ θ1
0
SW (θ)f(θ)dθ subject to (5)− (8). (12)
Before stating the solution to the above problem, we will make the following
restriction on the regulator’s beliefs for the tractability of our analysis in Section 3.4
Assumption 1. F (θ)/f(θ) is nondecreasing in θ ∈ (0, θ1].
Proposition 1. (Baron and Myerson, 1982) Let Assumption 1 hold. Then,
the solution to the regulator’s problem in (12) is given by the optimal policy 〈r¯, p¯,
q¯, s¯〉 satisfying equations (13)-(16) for all θ ∈ (0, θ1]:
p¯(θ) = θ + (1− α)F (θ)
f(θ)
(13)
q¯(θ) = D(p¯(θ)) (14)
r¯(θ) =
{
1 if V (q¯(θ))− p¯(θ)q¯(θ) ≥ K
0 otherwise
(15)
s¯(θ) = [K + θq¯(θ)− p¯(θ)q¯(θ)] r¯(θ) +
∫ θ1
θ
r¯(x)q¯(x)dx (16)
Note in the above proposition that inserting the optimal subsidy (16) into the
profit equation (10) yields
pi(θ) =
∫ θ1
θ
r¯(x)q¯(x)dx, (17)
4The optimal regulatory policy in Baron and Myerson (1982) is characterized without using
Assumption 1.
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implying that the profit of the monopolist is purely informational rent. It is clear
from (17) that this rent will be higher, the lower is the monopolist’s marginal cost
of production, θ. So, there is room for the monopolist in the B-M model to make
cost-reducing investment.
2.2 Integrating the B-M Model with Investment
Consider a pre-regulatory stage (called investment stage) in which the monopolist
has access to an investment (or simply research and development) technology to
reduce its production costs. This technology is described by a variable ρ ∈ [0, 1)
and a parameter γ ∈ (0, 1). Basically, this technology reduces a given marginal
cost of production θ to the level γθ with probability ρ. (We exclude ρ = 1, as
sure improvement will be assumed to be infinitely costly.) Since one may expect
higher likelihoods of improvement with a higher level of investment, the variable ρ
will be called the level of investment, for brevity. On the other hand, γ will be
called the improvement parameter, since the lower γ is, the higher the (production)
cost reduction obtained from a successful investment. We assume that γ is a fixed
parameter, while ρ is a control variable for the firm. We will leave stating the nature
of the regulator’s knowledge about the parameters γ and ρ to Section 3.
We will close our model by introducing R(ρ, γ) to denote the cost of using
the investment technology (ρ, γ). We assume that the function R is twice contin-
uously differentiable with respect to both of its arguments and satisfies the following.
Assumption 2. R(0, γ) = 0 (there are no sunk costs of investment).
Assumption 3. Rρ(ρ, γ) > 0 for all ρ ∈ (0, 1) (Investment cost is increasing in the
level of activities).
Assumption 4. Rρ(0, γ) = 0 (marginal cost is zero at zero investment).
Assumption 5. limρ↑1 Rρ(ρ, γ) = ∞ (improvement with certainty increases costs
unboundedly).
8
Assumption 6. Rρ ρ(ρ, γ) > 0 for all ρ ∈ [0, 1) (investment cost is strictly convex
in the level of activities).
Apart from ρ and γ, no parameter in our model affects the cost function R(., .).
While this function is known to the monopolist, it is completely unknown to the
regulator.5 Because of this informational asymmetry, the regulator will not be able
to optimally revise its optimal contract in (13)-(16) to influence investment of the
monopolist, even when she is aware of the possibility of investment.
3 Results
We will assume throughout the rest of this paper that the regulator can not contract
on investment. So, the level of investment, i.e., the value of the parameter ρ, will
be determined by the regulated monopolist. One can here suppose that we consider
an environment where the legal system does not allow the regulatory authority to
directly control investment or that the regulator cannot verify investment for a third
party (court) even when it is observable. In this environment, we will consider two
possibilities in the following two subsections, namely the case where investment is
observable to the regulator and the case where it is unobservable. (We will relegate
the proofs of all results to Appendix.)
3.1 Observable Investment
Here, we will consider an environment where the regulator is ex-ante aware of the
monopolist’s investment technology (γ, ρ) and knows the actual value of γ, the effi-
5The asymmetric assumption that the regulator is completely uninformed about investment
costs while she has incomplete information about production costs should make sense, once we
observe that unlike investment costs, production costs can be partially or completely inferred or
verified by the regulator through inspecting the quality of the product. See Sappington (1982) for
an investment model where the regulator (as well as the firm) has imperfect information about the
technology of cost reduction.
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ciency of investment. The regulator can also ex-post observe the monopolist’s choice
of ρ, the level of investment. Given her awareness about the investment technology,
the regulator will condition -before she observes investment of the monopolist- her
beliefs about the marginal cost of production on the parameter ρ; i.e. she will up-
date her prior beliefs f(.) to f(.|ρ) for ρ ∈ [0, 1). After the regulator observes the
realized investment of the monopolist, say the value ρ∗, her conditional beliefs will
accordingly change to f(.|ρ∗). Given these observations, we will now describe the
whole regulatory process in five stages:
Stage 1: The regulator learns that the monopolist has access to an investment
technology described by the pair of parameters ρ ∈ [0, 1) and γ ∈ (0, 1) and that
this technology will reduce the marginal cost of the monopolist by (1− γ)100% with
probability ρ. (At this stage, the regulator knows the actual value of γ; but she does
not know the actual value of ρ.)
Stage 2: The regulator announces that the regulatory policy will be given by the
B-M regulatory policy modified with respect to the conditional beliefs f(.|ρ), where
the actual value of ρ will be observed by the regulator in stage 4. (We will state this
modified regulatory policy in Proposition 2 by equations (22)-(25).)
Stage 3: In response to the announced regulatory policy, the monopolist with
the private marginal cost θ determines and realizes the level of investment as ρ∗(θ)
and learns whether its post-investment marginal cost is θ or γθ.
Stage 4: The regulator observes ρ∗(θ) and announces f(.|ρ∗(θ)) as her actual
beliefs.
Stage 5: The monopolist reports its post-investment marginal cost (γθ if the in-
vestment was successful, and θ otherwise), and the corresponding regulatory outcome
is calculated and implemented by the regulator.
With the regulator moving first in the investment game (stage 2) of the above
process, we implicitly assume that the regulator commits to particular policies that
could influence subsequent behavior of the monopolist (stage 3). If instead the
regulator could revise its choice after the monopolist chooses its investment, different
outcomes might occur. We implicitly consider a regulatory environment that involves
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adjustment costs, such as the difficulty of getting political approval, preventing such
a policy redesign.
Now we are ready to characterize the outcome of the above process. We will start
deriving the optimal policy the regulator will announce in the second stage. As the
regulator has become, in the first stage, aware of the investment technology that will
used by the monopolist, she can update her prior beliefs f(θ) at each θ ∈ (0, θ1) to
the posterior beliefs f(θ|ρ) for each possible value of ρ ∈ [0, 1) as follows:
f(θ|ρ) =

ρ
γ
f(θ/γ) + (1− ρ)f(θ) if 0 < θ ≤ γθ1,
(1− ρ)f(θ) if γθ1 < θ ≤ θ1.
(18)
Corresponding to the density function f(θ|ρ), the cumulative distribution and the
inverse hazard rate functions can be calculated as
F (θ|ρ) =
 ρF (θ/γ) + (1− ρ)F (θ) if 0 < θ ≤ γθ1,ρ+ (1− ρ)F (θ) if γθ1 < θ ≤ θ1, (19)
and
F (θ|ρ)
f(θ|ρ) =

ρF (θ/γ) + (1− ρ)F (θ)
ρ
γ
f(θ/γ) + (1− ρ)f(θ)
if 0 < θ ≤ γθ1,
ρ
(1− ρ)f(θ) +
F (θ)
f(θ)
if γθ1 < θ ≤ θ1,
(20)
respectively. When ρ is zero (the case of no investment), we have f(θ|ρ) = f(θ),
F (θ|ρ) = F (θ), and F (θ|ρ)/f(θ|ρ) = F (θ)/f(θ), as expected.
The regulator’s objective is to find optimal policy functions that will maximize
the expected social welfare under the updated beliefs f(θ|ρ):
max
r(.),p(.),q(.),s(.)
∫ θ1
0
SW (θ)f(θ|ρ)dθ subject to (5)− (8). (21)
One can immediately wonder whether the regulatory policy given by (13)-(16)
would solve the problem in (21) whenever the inverse hazard rate F (θ)/f(θ) in
that policy was replaced by F (θ|ρ)/f(θ|ρ). The answer is ‘yes’ if F (θ|ρ)/f(θ|ρ)
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is nondecreasing in θ.6 For this property to always hold, Assumption 1 will be
strengthened as follows.
Assumption 7. The density f(θ) is nonincreasing in θ ∈ (0, θ1].
Also, the following lemma will be instrumental to solve (21).
Lemma 1. Let Assumption 7 hold. Then, for all ρ ∈ [0, 1), the rate F (θ|ρ)/f(θ|ρ)
is increasing in θ ∈ (0, θ1].
We can now state the optimal regulatory policy under observable investment.
Proposition 2. Let Assumption 7 hold. Then, for any ρ ∈ [0, 1), the solution to
the regulator’s problem in (21) is given by the optimal policy 〈r¯ρ, p¯ρ, q¯ρ, s¯ρ〉 satisfying
equations (22)-(25) for all θ ∈ (0, θ1]:
p¯ρ(θ) = θ + (1− α)F (θ|ρ)
f(θ|ρ) (22)
q¯ρ(θ) = D(p¯ρ(θ)) (23)
r¯ρ(θ) =
{
1 if V (q¯ρ(θ))− p¯ρ(θ)q¯ρ(θ) ≥ K
0 otherwise
(24)
s¯ρ(θ) = [K + θq¯ρ(θ)− p¯ρ(θ)q¯ρ(θ)] r¯ρ(θ) +
∫ θ1
θ
r¯ρ(x)q¯ρ(x)dx (25)
Apparently, when ρ = 0, the optimal policy in the above proposition reduces to
the optimal policy (13)-(16) proposed by B-M, i.e., 〈p¯0, q¯0, r¯0, s¯0〉 = 〈p¯, q¯, r¯, s¯〉. In
fact, we could have derived Proposition 1 as a direct corollary to Proposition 2. To
study the effect of ρ on the regulatory outcome, the following assumption will be
6Mimicking the proof of Proposition 1, which was provided by B-M for the case of ρ = 0 in the
extended model of ours, one can easily show that the incentive-compatibility condition in (7) is
satisfied if the inverse hazard rate F (θ|ρ)/f(θ|ρ) is nondecreasing.
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useful.
Assumption 8. F (γθ)/f(γθ) < γF (θ)/f(θ), for all θ ∈ (0, θ1].
Assumption 8 requires that the gross rate of change in the inverse hazard rate due
to investment is bounded from above by the parameter γ. One can easily check
that this assumption is satisfied if F (θ)/f(θ) is strictly convex over θ ∈ [0,∞).
Assumptions 7 and 8 will be instrumental for the below lemma as well as for a
corollary to Proposition 2.
Lemma 2. Let Assumptions 7 and 8 hold. Then, for all θ ∈ (0, θ1], the inverse
hazard rate F (θ|ρ)/f(θ|ρ) is (i) increasing in ρ ∈ [0, 1); (ii) convex in ρ ∈ [0, 1).
Corollary 1. Let Assumptions 7 and 8 hold. Then, for all θ ∈ (0, θ1] and all
α ∈ [0, 1), the regulated output, q¯ρ(θ), is decreasing in ρ ∈ [0, 1).
The above result follows from the fact that with a higher level of investment,
the inverse hazard rate, i.e., the marginal informational cost, also becomes higher,
as ensured by Lemma 2(i). So, in situations where the regulated price depends
on the marginal informational cost (i.e., the cases where α 6= 1), the regulated
price will be higher, while the regulated output will be lower, with an increase in
investment. Admittedly, this result may seem quite counterintuitive at first sight: If
we expect that the investment of the monopolist will reduce its marginal cost with
some known probability, should not we then also expect its output to rise, after all?
The answer would obviously be ‘yes’ in the symmetric information case where the
whole social surplus goes to consumers and resultingly the socially optimal output,
under regulation, becomes consistent with marginal cost pricing. In the asymmetric
information case, however, the social surplus is shared between consumers and the
regulated monopolist, as the latter always earns a positive informational rent unless
α = 1. If there was no change in the output schedule in response to investment,
the expected informational rent of the regulated monopolist would increase as it is
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likely that its reported marginal cost would become lower thanks to investment. The
regulator can suppress the said increase in the informational rent only by reducing
the monopolist’s output schedule (i.e., the marginal informational rent) as suggested
by Corollary 1.
We will simplify the rest of our analysis, by the following assumption. (As we
will need this assumption in Section 3.2 and Section 3.4 for the case of ρ = 0 only,
we will state it here for each ρ separately.)
Assumption 9-[ρ]. V (q¯ρ(θ1))− p¯ρ(θ1)q¯ρ(θ1) > K.
To see the consequence of making the above assumption, we should note that for all
θ ∈ (0, θ1]
d [V (q¯ρ(θ))− p¯ρ(θ)q¯ρ(θ)]
dθ
= −dp¯
ρ(θ)
dθ
q¯ρ(θ) < 0, (26)
implying that consumer surplus is decreasing in θ ∈ (0, θ1]. Thus, Assumption 9-[ρ]
along with equation (24) will guarantee that when the level of investment is equal
to ρ, the monopolist will always be allowed to produce, i.e., r¯ρ(.) = 1.
After the regulator has announced the regulatory policy (22)-(25) in Stage 2, the
monopolist will choose, in Stage 3, the level of investment. Let pi(θ, ρ) denote the
profit of the monopolist if its marginal cost is θ and the realized investment is ρ.
Thus,
pi(θ, ρ) = [p¯ρ(θ)q¯ρ(θ)− C(q¯ρ(θ), θ)] r¯ρ(θ) + s¯ρ(θ)−R(ρ, γ). (27)
When Assumption 9-[ρ] holds, inserting (22)-(25) into (27) yields
pi(θ, ρ) =
∫ θ1
θ
q¯ρ(x)dx−R(ρ, γ). (28)
Likewise, pi(γθ, ρ) will denote the profit of the monopolist if its marginal cost is γθ
and the realized investment is ρ. Then, the expected profit pie(θ, ρ) of the monopolist
when its marginal cost θ is reduced to γθ with probability ρ can be written as
pie(θ, ρ) = ρpi(γθ, ρ) + (1− ρ)pi(θ, ρ), (29)
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or simply
pie(θ, ρ) = B(θ, ρ)−R(ρ, γ), (30)
with
B(θ, ρ) =
∫ θ1
θ
q¯ρ(x)dx+ ρ
∫ θ
γθ
q¯ρ(x)dx (31)
denoting the expected benefit of the monopolist. The first term in equation (31) is
the (sure) informational rent obtained by the monopolist irrespective of the success
of investment, whereas the second term is its (expected) additional informational
rent obtained when the marginal cost is reduced from θ to γθ with probability ρ.
The monopolist will decide to make investment (ρ > 0) only if the resulting
expected profit exceeds profit under no investment (ρ = 0), i.e.,
pie(θ, ρ)− pie(θ, 0) =
∫ θ1
θ
[
q¯ρ(x)− q¯0(x)] dx+ ρ∫ θ
γθ
q¯ρ(x)dx−R(ρ, γ) ≥ 0, (32)
where we have used R(0, γ) = 0 by Assumption 2. Under the above condition, the
monopolist’s problem of investment can be written as follows:
max
ρ∈[0,1)
pie(θ, ρ) subject to (32). (33)
Let ρ∗(θ) denote the solution to the above problem. When ρ∗(θ) is an interior
solution, it satisfies the first-order condition
Bρ(θ, ρ
∗(θ)) = Rρ(ρ∗(θ), γ), (34)
where
Bρ(θ, ρ) =
∫ θ1
θ
q¯ρρ(x)dx+
∫ θ
γθ
q¯ρ(x)dx+ ρ
∫ θ
γθ
q¯ρρ(x)dx (35)
for any ρ ∈ [0, 1). In the above equation, the second integral is always positive,
whereas the first and third integrals are negative unless α = 1 (by Corollary 1).
Therefore, the sign of Bρ(θ, ρ) is, in general, ambiguous. For arbitrarily small values
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of ρ, we will get rid of this ambiguity by assuming the following.
Assumption 10. Bρ(θ, 0) > 0 for all θ ∈ (0, θ1].
Note that given equation (35), Assumption 10 requires(∫ θ1
θ
q¯ρρ(x)dx+
∫ θ
γθ
q¯ρ(x)dx
)∣∣∣
ρ=0
> 0, (36)
for all θ ∈ (0, θ1]. Below, we show that this condition is satisfied if the social welfare
attaches a sufficiently high weight to the monopolist welfare.
Remark 1. Let Assumption 9-[0] hold. Then, Assumption 10 will be satisfied if α
is sufficiently close to 1.
The following Lemma will be instrumental for the rest of our results in Section 3.1.
Lemma 3. Pick any ρ ∈ [0, 1). Let Assumptions 6-8 and Assumption 9-[ρ] hold.
Then, pieρρ(θ, ρ) < 0 for all θ ∈ (0, θ1].
Now, we can state our first characterization result.
Proposition 3. Let Assumptions 2-8 and 10 hold and also Assumption 9-[ρ] hold
for all ρ ∈ [0, 1). Then, for all θ ∈ (0, θ1], the optimal level of observable investment,
ρ∗(θ), for the monopolist is unique, lies in (0,1), and satisfies(∫ θ1
θ
q¯ρρ(x)dx+
∫ θ
γθ
q¯ρ(x)dx+ ρ
∫ θ
γθ
q¯ρρ(x)dx
)∣∣∣
ρ=ρ∗(θ)
= Rρ(ρ
∗(θ), γ). (37)
Figure 1 illustrates how to graphically obtain the optimal level of observable
investment, ρ∗(θ), for the monopolist. Note that if α 6= 1, the marginal benefit curve
Bρ(θ, ρ) is given by the downward sloping curve in this figure. For this case, we find
ρ∗(θ) at the intersection of the marginal benefit and cost (green and red) curves.
On the other hand, if α = 1, the regulated output function becomes independent
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of ρ, since q¯ρ(.) = q¯(.) = D(.). In this case, the marginal benefit curve becomes
the (dotted) horizontal line. Corollary 4 will later show (by proving the inequality
Bρα(θ, .) > 0) that ρ
∗(θ) is in a positive relationship with α, implying that the
optimal level of investment in the case α = 1 is higher than in the case α 6= 1, as
also apparent from Figure 1.
Rρ(ρ,γ)
0 ρ*(θ) 1 ρ
Bρ(θ,ρ)   if α ϵ [0,1)
θ
γθ
Bρ(θ,ρ)= ʃ D(x)dx  if α =1
Figure 1. Observable Investment Decision of a Regulated Monopolist
Corollary 1 and Proposition 3 together allow us to identify the effect of adding
observable investment into the B-M model on the optimal output schedule.
Proposition 4. Let Assumptions 2-8 and 10 hold and also Assumption 9-[ρ] hold
for all ρ ∈ [0, 1). Then, the optimal output schedule in the integrated B-M model
with observable investment is always below the optimal output schedule in the B-M
model without investment, i.e., q¯ρ
∗(θ)(θ) < q¯(θ) for all θ ∈ (0, θ1].
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The above result implies that the addition of observable investment decision to
the BM model of regulation always reduces the ex-post output regardless whether
the investment becomes successful or not. Below, we will examine how the optimal
level of investment varies with the marginal cost. However, we need to first ensure
that investment, when successful, will increase productive efficiency at the regulated
output.
Assumption 11-[ρ]. Production costs are lower when investment is successful
than when it is not; i.e., C(q¯ρ(γθ), γθ) < C(q¯ρ(θ), θ) for all θ ∈ (0, θ1].
Corollary 2. Let Assumptions 2-8 and 10 hold and Assumptions 9-[ρ] and 11-[ρ]
hold for all ρ ∈ [0, 1). Then, the optimal level of observable investment, ρ∗(θ), is
increasing in θ ∈ (0, θ1].
Interestingly, the above result implies that in regulatory environments where
investment increases productive efficiency, a less efficient monopolist would always
choose to invest more than a more efficient monopolist. Now we can explore the
dependence of ρ∗(θ) on the parameter γ. For this, we need to estimate Bργ(θ, .),
the response of the marginal benefit schedule to a change in γ. Unfortunately, the
impact of γ on the partial derivative q¯ρρ(.) appearing in the first and third integrals
of (35) is indeterminate because of the ambiguous effect of γ on the marginal
informational cost function F (.|ρ)/f(.|ρ) and its rate of change ∂[F (.|ρ)/f(.|ρ)]/∂ρ.
However, in situations where the welfare weight α is sufficiently close to 1, the effects
of these two terms on q¯ρ(.) and ∂q¯ρ(.)/∂ρ become negligible. In such situations, the
impact of γ on ρ∗(θ) can be predicted, provided that the following assumption is
also satisfied.
Assumption 12. Rρ,γ(ρ, γ) > 0 for all ρ ∈ [0, 1) and γ ∈ (0, 1) (marginal cost of
investment is decreasing with the improvement level, i.e., increasing in γ).
Corollary 3. Let Assumptions 2-8 and 12 hold and Assumption 9-[ρ] hold for
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all ρ ∈ [0, 1). If α is sufficiently close to one, then for all values of θ ∈ (0, θ], the
optimal level of observable investment, ρ∗(θ), is increasing with the improvement
level, i.e., decreasing in γ ∈ (0, 1).
The above result is intuitive once we observe (from the above discussion) that
when α is sufficiently close to one, the effect of an increase in the improvement level of
investment (or a decrease in γ) on the marginal benefit Bρ(θ, ρ) can be approximated
by the increase in the uncertain marginal benefit of investment, i.e., the increase in
the integral
∫ θ
γθ
q¯ρ(x)dx stemming from a decrease in γ, thanks to the negligibility of
the first and third integrals in (35) when α is sufficiently high. Thus, we expect the
curve Bρ(θ, ρ) in Figure 1 to shift up when γ decreases. On the other hand, the cost
curve R(ρ, γ) would shift down under Assumption 12, yielding an increase in ρ∗(θ).
In the next corollary, we show that when the social welfare is more equitable or
the demand for the regulated product is higher, the monopolist will choose a higher
level of investment.
Corollary 4. Let Assumptions 2-8 and 10 hold and Assumption 9-[ρ] hold for
all ρ ∈ [0, 1). Then, for all values of θ ∈ (0, θ1], the optimal level of observable
investment, ρ∗(θ), is increasing in both α ∈ [0, 1] and D0 ∈ (0,∞).
It should be obvious from the optimal policy in (22)-(25) that the higher the
welfare parameter α or the higher the maximal demand, D0, the higher will be
marginal informational rent at each cost level, and consequently the higher will be
the marginal benefit of investment, implying a higher value for ρ∗(θ).
3.2 Unobservable Investment
Here, we will consider an environment where the regulator is not aware of the mo-
nopolist’s investment technology (γ, ρ). Additionally, the regulator cannot ex-post
observe the investment made by the monopolist (i.e., the realized value of ρ). Nat-
urally, in this environment the beliefs of the regulator about the marginal cost of
production will always be equal to her prior beliefs, i.e., f(.|0) = f(.), and result-
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ingly the regulatory policy that she considers to be optimal will be 〈r¯, p¯, q¯, s¯〉, given
by (13)-(16) calculated under the regulator’s prior beliefs f(.). Although the addition
of the unobservable investment into the BM model of regulation will not change the
regulatory policy schedules; it will change the realizations of these schedules at the
reported cost of the monopolist if its investment becomes successful and decreases
the marginal cost of the monopolist, say from θ to γθ. The likely change in the
marginal cost of production will clearly affect the informational rent of the monop-
olist, too. Observing this, the monopolist can calculate its expected profit for each
possible investment level and then determine its optimal investment.
To simplify the rest of our analysis, we will suppose that Assumption 9-[0] holds,
implying that r¯(.) = 1. Now, let us fix θ ∈ (0, θ1] and γ ∈ (0, 1). When the level of
investment is ρ, the profit expected by the monopolist can be written as
pie(θ, ρ) = ρpi(γθ) + (1− ρ)pi(θ)−R(ρ, γ), (38)
or simply
pie(θ, ρ) = B(ρ, γ)−R(ρ, γ) (39)
with
B(ρ, γ) =
∫ θ1
θ
q¯(x)dx+ ρ
∫ θ
γθ
q¯(x)dx (40)
denoting the expected benefit of the monopolist. Differentiating pie(θ, ρ) with respect
to ρ yields
pieρ(θ, ρ) = Bρ(ρ, γ)−Rρ(ρ, γ) =
∫ θ
γθ
q¯(x)dx−Rρ(ρ, γ). (41)
Clearly, pieρ(θ, 0) > 0 and limρ↑1 pi
e
ρ(θ, ρ) = −∞.
The monopolist will choose to make investment (ρ > 0) only if the resulting
expected profit exceeds the profit under no investment (ρ = 0), i.e.,
pie(θ, ρ) ≥ pie(θ, 0) (42)
or equivalently
ρ
∫ θ
γθ
q¯(x)dx−R(ρ, γ) ≥ 0, (43)
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where we have used R(0, γ) = 0 by Assumption 2. The above inequality requires
that the expected additional informational rent is not below the average cost of
investment, i.e.,∫ θ
γθ
q¯(x)dx ≥ R(ρ, γ)
ρ
. (44)
Using this last condition, the monopolist’s investment problem can be written as
follows:
max
ρ∈[0,1)
pie(θ, ρ) subject to (44). (45)
We can now state our second characterization result.
Proposition 5. Let Assumptions 1-6 and 9-[0] hold. Then, for all θ ∈ (0, θ1], the
optimal level of unobservable investment, ρ∗(θ), for the monopolist is unique, lies in
(0,1), and satisfies∫ θ
γθ
q¯(x)dx = Rρ(ρ
∗(θ), γ). (46)
Figure 2 illustrates how the optimal investment level ρ∗(θ) balances the marginal
benefit and marginal cost of investment. Here, the marginal benefit curve is always
horizontal unlike in Figure 1. In fact, this horizontal curve always lies above the
varying marginal benefit curve in Figure 1. This will enable us to compare the
optimal levels of observable and unobservable investments, which we leave to Section
3.3.
The following result shows that our finding in Corollary 2, linking the optimal
level of observable investment negatively to the productive efficiency, is actually
independent of whether investment is observable or not.
Corollary 5. Let Assumptions 1-6, 9-[0], and 11-[0] hold. Then, the optimal level
of unobservable investment, ρ∗(θ), is increasing in θ ∈ (0, θ1].
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ʃ q(x)dx‾θ
Rρ(ρ,γ)
γθ
Bρ(θ,ρ)=
0 ρ*(θ) 1 ρ
Figure 2. Unobservable Investment Decision of a Regulated Monopolist
Likewise, Corollary 6 will show together with Corollary 3 and 4 that the inability
of the regulator to observe the investment of the monopolist has no effect on the
direction of the relationship between the optimal level of investment and several
parameters of our model, involving γ, α, and D0.
Corollary 6. Let Assumptions 1-6, 9-[0] and 12 hold. Then, for all θ ∈ (0, θ1],
the optimal level of unobservable investment, ρ∗(θ), is increasing in α ∈ [0, 1] and
D0 ∈ (0,∞), while decreasing in γ ∈ (0, 1) (or increasing in the improvement level).
3.3 Effect of Unobservability on the Investment Decision
Now, we will explore how unobservability affects the investment decision of a
regulated monopolist. Basically, we will compare the values of ρ∗(θ) calculated
in Sections 3.1 and 3.2. This comparison will critically depend on whether the
regulator weights the welfares of consumers and the monopolist equally or not.
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Proposition 6. Let Assumptions 2-8 and 10 hold and Assumption 9-[ρ] hold for
all ρ ∈ [0, 1). Then for all θ ∈ (0, θ1], the optimal level of investment, ρ∗(θ), for the
monopolist is (i) independent of the observability of investment if α = 1, (ii) lower
when investment is observable than when it is unobservable if α ∈ [0, 1).
Part (i) of the above result stems from the observation that with α = 1, we have
q¯p(θ) = q¯(θ) = D(θ). This implies that under Assumption 9-[0], the marginal benefits
of investment are the same (as given by Bρ(θ, ρ) =
∫ θ
γθ
D(x)dx) in Section 3.1 and
Section 3.2. On the other hand, part (ii) of Proposition 6 follows from the fact that
the marginal informational rent function (or the adjusted demand function) has lower
values when investment is observable than when it is not, i.e., q¯ρ(.) < q¯0(.) = q¯(.) for
all ρ ∈ (0, 1), also implying lower marginal benefits of investment under observability.
(The dotted horizontal line in Figure 1 corresponds to the marginal benefit curve
for unobservable investment, which is always above the downward sloping marginal
benefit curve for observable investment.)
We should also note that Proposition 6, along with Propositions 3 and 5, implies
that for each θ ∈ (0, θ1], the optimal level of investment, ρ∗(θ), attains its maximal
level when α = 1, i.e., whenever the outcome under the Baron and Myerson’s (1982)
regulatory policy essentially boils down to the outcome under Loeb and Magat’s
(1979) delegation scheme. The reason is that the monopolist in this particular case
is entitled to the whole social surplus under the original demand curve (within the
range of possible marginal costs). Thus, the (constant) marginal benefit of investment
will be at its highest level, implying that for any level of the marginal cost the optimal
investment will also be at its maximum.
Finally, our results in Section 3.1 and Section 3.2 also show that regardless
whether investment is observable or not, the optimal level of investment, ρ∗(θ), is
increasing in θ, α and D0 and decreasing in γ.
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3.4 Effect of Regulation on the Investment Decision
Our final goal is to estimate the impact of output regulation on the monopolist’s in-
vestment decision. For this, we have to calculate first the optimal level of investment
for the monopolist when the price and output of its product are not regulated.
Let us pick any θ ∈ (0, θ1]. One can easily verify that when the unregulated
monopoly does not make any investment, it would optimally choose the price and
output of its product as pm(θ) = (D0 + D1θ)/2 and q
m(θ) = (D0 −D1θ)/2, respec-
tively. Resultingly, the monopolist’s profit, pim(θ), would become
pim(θ) = pm(θ)qm(θ)− θqm(θ)−K = (D0 −D1θ)
2
4D1
−K. (47)
On the other hand, the profit the monopolist can expect under the investment tech-
nology (γ, ρ) is equal to
pim,e(θ, ρ) = ρpim(γθ) + (1− ρ)pim(θ)−R(ρ, γ), (48)
or simply
pim,e(θ, ρ) = B(θ, ρ)−R(ρ, γ), (49)
with
Bm(θ, ρ) = ρ
(D0 −D1γθ)2
4D1
+ (1− ρ)(D0 −D1θ)
2
4D1
−K (50)
denoting the expected benefit of the monopolist. The monopolist will choose to make
investment (ρ > 0) if and only if
pim,e(θ, ρ)− pim,e(θ, 0) ≥ 0 (51)
or equivalently
pim(γθ)− pim(θ) ≥ R(ρ, γ)
ρ
, (52)
where we have used R(0, γ) = 0 by Assumption 2. Thus, the monopolist’s investment
problem can be written as
max
ρ∈[0,1)
pim,e(θ, ρ), subject to (52). (53)
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Noting that
pim,eρ (θ, ρ) = B
m
ρ (θ, ρ)−Rρ(ρ, γ)
=
(1− γ)θ
2
D
(
(1 + γ)θ
2
)
−Rρ(ρ, γ) (54)
and
pim,eρρ (θ, ρ) = −Rρρ(ρ, γ), (55)
we are ready to present our final characterization.
Proposition 7. Let Assumptions 2-6 hold. Then for all θ ∈ (0, θ1], the optimal
level of investment, ρm(θ), for an unregulated monopolist is unique, lies in (0,1), and
satisfies
(1− γ)θ
2
D
(
(1 + γ)θ
2
)
= Rρ(ρ
m(θ), γ). (56)
Using the characterizations provided by Propositions 5 and 7, we can compare
the unobservable investment decision of a regulated monopolist to the investment
decision of an unregulated monopolist, in situations where the regulator treats the
welfares of consumer and the monopolist sufficiently equally.
Proposition 8. Let Assumptions 1-6 and 9-[0] hold. If α is sufficiently close to 1,
then the optimal level of unobservable investment of a monopolist whose price and
output are regulated is always higher than the optimal investment of an unregulated
monopolist. That is, ρ∗(θ) satisfying (46) is higher than ρm(θ) satisfying (56).
Figure 3 illustrates the above result graphically. (Apparently, the intersection of
the dotted horizontal line, depicting the curve for the marginal benefits of unobserv-
able investment of a regulated monopolist, with the upward sloping marginal cost
curve occurs at a higher value of ρ than the optimal level of investment, ρm(θ), chosen
by an unregulated monopolist.) The result in Proposition 8 is intuitive since in the
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extreme case where the regulator’s objective attaches equal weights to the welfares of
consumers and the monopolist, the outcome of the regulatory incentive-compatible
policy used in the monopoly market coincides with the outcome of the delegation
scheme of Loeb and Magat (1979), which entitles the monopolist to the whole social
surplus at the sold output. This surplus always exceeds the unregulated monopoly
profit, offering higher incentives to the monopolist for making investment when its
production is regulated than when it is not.
ʃ q(x)dx‾θ
Rρ(ρ,γ)
γθ
Bρ(θ,ρ)=
0 ρm(θ) 1 ρ
Bmρ(θ,ρ) = pim(γθ) ─  pim(θ)
Figure 3. Investment Decision of an Unregulated Monopolist
On the other hand, in cases where the social welfare favors consumer welfare too
much in relative to producer welfare (i.e., α is sufficiently small), it is not possi-
ble to compare the investment decision of the regulated monopolist to that of the
unregulated monopolist even in the simpler situation where investment is unobserv-
able. The reason is that under the regulatory policy (13)-(16), the adjusted demand
schedule q¯(.) affecting the informational rent of the monopolist nontrivially depends
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on the beliefs of the regulator through the inverse hazard rate function F/f , whose
range may involve any positive real. However, it is also obvious that the lower the
weight parameter α is, the higher will be the effect of the inverse hazard rate on the
quantity schedule. In other words, the lower the parameter α, the more suppressed
the marginal benefit curve of the regulated monopolist, implying that the difference
ρ∗(θ)− ρm(θ) will also be lower.
4 Conclusion
This paper has studied whether the underinvestment effect of observability, earlier
obtained by Tirole (1986) in a procurement model with investment, where both
parties of the economic transaction, namely the buyer and the seller, have some
asymmetric information, can also arise in a principal-agent model where ‘only’ the
party that undertakes the investment, namely the agent, has some private informa-
tion. The principal-agent model we have considered simply integrates investment
with the monopoly regulation model of Baron and Myerson (1982). In this inte-
grated framework, the regulator (principal) can contract on the price and output of
the good produced by the monopolist (agent) but not on the investment the monop-
olist makes before production. We have considered both the case where investment
is observable to the regulator and the case where it is not. For both cases, we have
characterized the optimal level of investment chosen by the monopolist under some
conditions ensuring the uniqueness and positiveness.
Irrespective of the observability issue, we have found that the optimal level of
investment is higher when the monopolist is productively less efficient, provided that
investment always increases productive efficiency. In addition, the improvement level
of investment, the maximal size of demand and the relative weight of the monopolist
welfare have, all, positive impacts on the optimal level of investment. However, the
main result of our study is that the optimal level of investment is, in general, lower
when investment is observable than when it is unobservable. Our result, along with
the earlier result of Tirole (1986) in the same direction, reveals that the phenomenon
of ‘underinvestment due to observability’ is independent of whether only the invest-
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ing firm or all of the parties affected by its investment decision have some private
information about the post-investment economic relationship.
Why observability leads to underinvestment can be explained in our model by
the well-known “ratchet effect” in the mechanism design literature, an effect similar
to the ‘information effect’ offered by Tirole (1986) (which we have already addressed
in Section 1).7 Basically, a contract that conditions (through the conditional beliefs
of the regulator) on the level of investment is equivalent to ratcheting, whereby
a monopolistic firm that demonstrates (through investment) that it is a lower cost
supplier, will be required to supply at lower costs. Anticipating this, the firm chooses
to invest less, to avoid the ratcheting up of its performance standards.
Our results also show that when the social welfare attaches a sufficiently high
weight to the monopolist welfare, the unobservable investment of a regulated mo-
nopolist always exceeds the investment of an unregulated monopolist. This is because
of the fact that when the deadweight loss of subsidy is negligible, the optimal sub-
sidy schedule entitles the regulated monopolist to almost the whole social surplus,
creating for it extremely high incentives for cost-reducing investment.
An important extension of our model would be the consideration of an environ-
ment where the regulator’s observation about the likelihood of success - and or the
improvement level - of investment is incomplete. Fruitfully, one can also consider
environments where the regulator is authorized not only to control the price and
output of the monopolistic product but also to control or influence its investment.
We have implicitly assumed in our model that the regulator has limited ability (sim-
ply working through her beliefs) to influence the monopolist’s investment because
of some political or legal barriers or some conflicts of interests. Recall that in the
case of fully observable investment, the regulator in our model is able to update
her beliefs about the monopolist’s costs (as f(.|ρ∗)) after observing the investment
level, ρ∗, optimally chosen by the monopolist. However, although it may be subgame
perfect for the regulator to resort to the B-M menu for the updated distribution,
it is sub optimal to do so. In situations where the regulator has the full ability to
control/determine the investment of the monopolist, she could set it at some socially
7See Weitzman (1980) and Freixas et al. (1985) for a discussion on the ratchet effect.
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efficient level, ρs, and could commit to the B-M menu corresponding to the belief
distribution f(.|ρs). In this way the regulator would use her commitment ability
to achieve the desired investment.8 It may be interesting to check in that setup,
the validity of a well-known proposition of Arrow (1959), claiming that an (unreg-
ulated) monopolist always has a lower incentive to innovate than a social planner
and therefore its R&D (investment) choice is socially suboptimal. In fact, in situa-
tions where the social welfare treats consumer and producer welfare equally α = 1,
our results readily show that the regulated monopolist and the social planner would
always have the same incentive to innovate, since irrespective of observability the
regulatory output policy in this case would boil down to the policy consistent with
marginal cost pricing, implying that the welfare (informational rent) of the monop-
olist becomes as high as the whole social surplus. On the other hand, it is also clear
that in situations where α 6= 1, the incentives of the regulated monopolist and the
social planner would no longer be aligned because of the deadweight loss of subsidy,
which is not internalized by the monopolist. Future study may explore whether in
this case the unregulated investment activities of the regulated monopolist would be
socially excessive or inadequate.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. See pages 920-921 of Baron and Myerson (1982). 
Proof of Lemma 1. Pick any ρ ∈ [0, 1). Assumption 7 ensures that F (θ|ρ)/f(θ|ρ)
is increasing in θ ∈ (0, θ1] if θ 6= γθ1. One can also check that
F (γθ1|ρ)
f(γθ1|ρ) − limθ↓γθ1
F (θ|ρ)
f(θ|ρ) =
−f(θ1)F (γθ1)− ρ(1−ρ)f(θ1)
f(γθ1)
[
f(θ1) +
γ(1−ρ)
ρ
f(γθ1)
] < 0, (57)
completing the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Directly obtained by mimicking the proof of Proposition
1 (thanks to Lemma 1). 
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Proof of Lemma 2. Differentiating (20) with respect to ρ yields
∂ [F (θ|ρ)/f(θ|ρ)]
∂ρ
=

F (θ/γ)f(θ)− 1
γ
F (θ)f(θ/γ)
[ρf(θ/γ) + (1− ρ)f(θ)]2 if 0 < θ ≤ γθ1,
1
(1− ρ)2f(θ) if γθ1 < θ ≤ θ1.
(58)
The second line of the above derivative is always positive. Rewriting Assumption
8 for any θ ∈ (0, γθ1] as F (θ)/f(θ) < γF (θ/γ)/f(θ/γ), we obtain that the first
line of (58) is always positive, too. Thus F (θ|ρ)/f(θ|ρ) is increasing in ρ, proving
part (i). Also, by Assumption 7, ∂[F (θ|ρ)/f(θ|ρ)]/∂ρ is nondecreasing in ρ, proving
convexity. 
Proof of Corollary 1. Directly obtained from equations (22) and (23), given
Lemma 2(i). 
Proof of Remark 1. By Assumption 9-[0], Assumption 10 holds if (36)
is satisfied. Pick any θ ∈ (0, θ1]. We have q¯0(θ) = q¯(θ) and therefore,∫ θ
γθ
q¯0(x)dx =
∫ θ
γθ
q¯(x)dx, which is always positive, by equations (13) and (14). Now,
let α = 1. For all ρ ∈ [0, 1), q¯ρ(θ) = q¯(θ) = D(θ), implying ∂q¯ρ(θ)/∂ρ = 0. Thus,
Bρ(θ, 0) =
∫ θ
γθ
q¯(x)dx > 0. Since both q¯ρ(.) and q¯ρρ(.) are continuous in α, (36) holds
for all α ∈ [0, 1] which are sufficiently close to 1. 
Proof of Lemma 3. Pick any θ ∈ (0, θ1] and ρ ∈ [0, 1). Since Assumption 9-[ρ]
holds, Bρ(θ, ρ) is given by (35). Differentiating Bρ(θ, ρ) with respect to ρ yields
Bρ ρ(θ, ρ) =
∫ θ1
θ
q¯ρρρ(x)dx+ 2
∫ θ
γθ
q¯ρρ(x)dx+ ρ
∫ θ
γθ
q¯ρρρ(x)dx. (59)
First let α ∈ [0, 1). Thanks to Assumptions 7 and 8, we have q¯ρρ(θ) < 0 by Corollary
1, and
q¯ρρρ(θ) = D
′(p¯ρ(θ))(1− α)∂
2 [F (θ|ρ)/f(θ|ρ)]
∂ρ2
≤ 0, (60)
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by Lemma 2-(ii). Therefore, Bρρ(θ, ρ) < 0. Now let α = 1. Then, we have
qρ(.) = q¯(.) = D(.), implying Bρρ(θ, ρ) = 0. Thus, for all α ∈ [0, 1], we have
Bρρ(θ, ρ) ≤ 0. Moreover, we have Rρρ(θ, ρ) > 0 by Assumption 6, implying
pieρ ρ(θ, ρ) < 0. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Pick any θ ∈ (0, θ1]. By Proposition 2 (thanks to As-
sumption 7), the optimal regulatory policy is given by (22)-(25). Note from equations
(34) and (35) that under Assumption 9-[ρ], equation (37) is the first order condition
for the problem in (33). Assumption 5 implies that ρ∗(θ) < 1. On the other hand,
Assumptions 3-5 along with Assumption 10 and the continuity of pie(θ, ρ) in ρ imply
that ρ∗(θ) > 0.
Now, pick any ρ ∈ [0, 1) and note that pieρ ρ(θ, ρ) < 0 by Lemma 3 (thanks to
Assumptions 6-8 and 9-[ρ]). Thus, ρ∗(θ) satisfies the second-order condition and it
is unique.
Finally, note that Assumptions 4 and 10 imply pieρ(θ, 0) > 0, while the continuity
of Bρ(θ, ρ) and Rρ(ρ, γ) with respect to ρ imply that pi
e
ρ(θ, ρ) is continuous in ρ.
Since we have already found that ρ∗(θ) is the unique maximizer of pie(θ, ρ) among all
ρ ∈ [0, 1), we must have pie(θ, ρ∗(θ))− pie(θ, 0) > 0, ensuring the feasibility condition
(32). 
Proof of Proposition 4. Due to the assumptions of the proposition, both
Corollary 1 and Proposition 3 hold. Pick any θ ∈ (0, θ1]. Corollary 1 implies
q¯ρρ(θ) < 0 for all ρ ∈ [0, 1). On the other hand, Proposition 3 ensures that ρ∗(θ) lies
in (0,1). Therefore, q¯ρ
∗(θ)(θ) < q¯0(θ) = q¯(θ). 
Proof of Corollary 2. Pick any θ ∈ (0, θ1]. Since Assumptions 2-8 and 10 hold and
Assumption 9-[ρ] holds for all ρ ∈ [0, 1), Proposition 3 ensures that ρ∗(θ) is unique,
lies in (0,1), and satisfies pieρ(θ, ρ
∗(θ)) = 0 as in (37). Now, pick any ρ ∈ [0, 1). By
Assumption 9-[ρ], Bρ(θ, ρ) is given by (35). Differentiating (35) with respect to θ
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yields
Bρ θ(θ, ρ) = q¯
ρ(θ)− γq¯ρ(γθ) + ρ [q¯ρρ(θ)− q¯ρρ(γθ)]− q¯ρρ(θ)
= q¯ρ(θ)− γq¯ρ(γθ) + (ρ− 1)q¯ρρ(θ)− ρq¯ρρ(γθ). (61)
First let α ∈ [0, 1). By Corollary 1 (thanks to Assumptions 7 and 8), q¯ρρ(θ) < 0.
Now let α = 1. Then q¯ρρ(θ) = 0, since q¯
ρ(θ) = q¯(θ) = D(θ). So, for all
α ∈ [0, 1], we have q¯ρρ(θ) ≤ 0. On the other hand, by Assumption 11-[ρ], it is
true that C(q¯ρ(θ), θ) > C(q¯ρ(γθ), γθ), or equivalently q¯ρ(θ) > γq¯ρ(γθ). Therefore,
Bρ θ(θ, ρ) > 0, implying pi
e
ρ θ(θ, ρ) > 0 since Rρ θ(ρ, γ) = 0. Additionally, for all
ρ ∈ [0, 1], pie,ρ,γρ ρ (θ) < 0 by Lemma 3 (thanks to Assumptions 6-8 and 9-[ρ]). Since
pieρ(θ, ρ
∗(θ)) = 0, ρ∗(θ) must be increasing in θ ∈ (0, θ1]. 
Proof of Corollary 3. Pick any θ ∈ (0, θ1]. Assumption 9-[0] implies Assumption
10. Since Assumptions 2-8 and 10 hold and Assumption 9-[ρ] holds for all ρ ∈ [0, 1),
Proposition 3 ensures that ρ∗(θ) is unique, lies in (0,1), and satisfies pieρ(θ, ρ
∗(θ)) = 0
as in (37). Now, pick any ρ ∈ [0, 1). First, let α = 1. From equations (22), (23), and
(24) it follows that q¯ρ(θ) = q¯(θ) = D(θ), hence q¯ρρ(θ) = 0 for all θ ∈ (0, θ1]. Since
Assumption 9-[ρ] holds, r¯ρ(θ) = 1 for all θ ∈ (0, θ1]. Thus, equation (35) implies
Bρ(θ, ρ) =
∫ θ
γθ
q¯(x)dx. It follows that Bρ γ(θ, ρ) = −θq¯(γθ) < 0; implying pieρ γ(θ, ρ) =
−θq¯(γθ)−Rρ γ(ρ, γ) < 0 by Assumption 12. Moreover, for all ρ ∈ [0, 1), pieρρ(θ, ρ) < 0
by Lemma 3 (thanks to Assumptions 6-8 and 9-[ρ]). Since pieρ(θ, ρ
∗(θ)) = 0, ρ∗(θ)
must be decreasing in γ ∈ (0, 1).
Finally, since Bρ γ(θ, ρ) is continuous in α and the differences q¯
ρ(.) − q¯(.) and
q¯ρρ(.) − q¯ρ(.) = q¯ρρ(.) are negligible when 1 − α is sufficiently small, the above result
obtained for α = 1 is also true for all α ∈ [0, 1] which are sufficiently close to 1. 
Proof of Corollary 4. Pick any θ ∈ (0, θ1]. Since Assumptions 2-8 and 10 hold and
Assumption 9-[ρ] holds for all ρ ∈ [0, 1), Proposition 3 ensures that ρ∗(θ) is unique,
lies in (0,1), and satisfies pieρ(θ, ρ
∗(θ)) = 0 as in (37). Now, pick any ρ ∈ [0, 1). Since
Assumption 9-[ρ] holds, r¯ρ(θ) = 1 for all θ ∈ (0, θ1]. It follows from (22) and (23)
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that q¯ρ(θ) is increasing in both α ∈ [0, 1] and D0 ∈ (0,∞). Moreover, we have
∂2q¯ρ(θ)/∂ρ∂α = −D′(p¯ρ(θ))∂(F (θ|ρ)/f(θ|ρ))/∂ρ > 0 (62)
and
∂2q¯ρ(θ)/∂ρ∂D0 = 0. (63)
Then, it follows from (35) that Bρα(θ, ρ) > 0 and BρD0(θ ρ) > 0, implying
pieρα(θ, ρ) > 0 and pi
e
ρD0
(θ, ρ) > 0. Moreover, for all ρ ∈ [0, 1), pie,ρ,γρ ρ (θ) < 0 by
Lemma 3 (thanks to Assumptions 6-8 and 9-[ρ]). Since pieρ(θ, ρ
∗(θ)) = 0, ρ∗(θ) must
be increasing in both α ∈ [0, 1] and D0 ∈ (0,∞). 
Proof of Proposition 5. Pick any θ ∈ (0, θ1]. By Assumption 1, the optimal
regulatory policy is given by (13)-(16). Assumption 9-[0] implies that r¯(.) = 1.
Then, (46) is the first order condition for the problem (45). The marginal benefit
of investment
∫ θ
γθ
q¯(x)dx is always positive by (13), and (14). Then, Assumptions 3
and 4 imply ρ∗(θ) > 0, whereas Assumption 5 implies ρ∗(θ) < 1. On the other hand,
Assumptions 2 and 6 imply that Rρ(ρ
∗(θ), γ) > R(ρ∗(θ), γ)/ρ∗(θ); so (44) is satisfied
at ρ∗(θ). Finally, the second order condition holds, since pieρρ(θ, ρ) = −Rρρ(ρ, γ) < 0
by Assumption 6. This also ensures that ρ∗(θ) is unique. 
Proof of Corollary 5. Pick any θ ∈ (0, θ1]. Since Assumptions 1-6 and 9-[0] hold,
Proposition 5 ensures that ρ∗(θ) is unique, lies in (0,1), and satisfies pieρ(θ, ρ
∗(θ)) = 0
as in (46). By Assumption 1, the optimal regulatory policy is given by (13)-(16).
Assumption 9-[0] implies that r¯(.) = 1. Now pick any ρ ∈ (0, θ1]. Differentiating
(41) with respect to θ yields
pieρ θ(θ, ρ) = q¯(θ)− γq¯(γθ), (64)
which is always positive, since γ < 1, Assumption 11-[0] holds, and q¯(.) is de-
creasing by (13) and (14), thanks to Assumption 1. Moreover, for all ρ ∈ [0, 1),
pieρρ(θ, ρ) = −Rρρ(ρ, γ) < 0 by Assumption 6. Since pieρ(θ, ρ∗(θ)) = 0, ρ∗(θ) must be
increasing in θ ∈ (0, θ1]. 
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Proof of Corollary 6. Pick any θ ∈ (0, θ1]. Since Assumptions 1-6 and 9-[0] hold,
Proposition 5 ensures that ρ∗(θ) is unique, lies in (0,1), and satisfies pieρ(θ, ρ
∗(θ)) = 0
as in (46). By Assumption 1, the optimal regulatory policy is given by (13)-(16).
Assumption 9-[0] implies that r¯(.) = 1. Now pick any ρ ∈ (0, θ1]. Differentiating
(41) with respect to γ yields
pieρ γ(θ, ρ) = −θq¯(γθ)−Rρ γ(ρ, γ), (65)
which is always negative, since Assumption 12 holds, θ > 0, γ > 0, and q¯(γθ) > 0,
by equations (13) and (14). On the other hand, for any z ∈ {α,D0}, differentiating
(41) with respect to z yields
pieρ z(θ, ρ) =
∫ θ
γθ
q¯z(x)dx, (66)
which is always positive, since q¯(.) is increasing in both α and D0 by equations
(13) and (14). Moreover, for all ρ ∈ [0, 1), we have pieρρ(θ, ρ) = −Rρρ(ρ, γ) < 0 by
Assumption 6. Since pieρ(θ, ρ
∗(θ)) = 0, ρ∗(θ) must be decreasing in γ ∈ (0, 1) and
increasing in both α ∈ [0, 1] and D0 ∈ (0,∞). 
Proof of Proposition 6. Let us first show part (i) holds. Let α = 1. Then, it
follows from Propositions 1 and 2 that q¯ρ(θ) = q¯(θ) = D(θ) for all θ ∈ (0, θ1]. In
that case, the profit pie(θ, ρ) under both observable and unobservable investment is
given by
pie(θ, ρ) =
∫ θ1
θ
D(x)dx+ ρ
∫ θ
γθ
D(x)dx−R(ρ, γ). (67)
Thus, the optimal level of investment, will be the same irrespective of the
observability of investment. Now, we will consider part (ii) of Proposition
6. Let α ∈ [0, 1). Pick any θ ∈ (0, θ1], γ ∈ (0, 1), and ρ ∈ [0, 1). Note
from (41) that when investment is unobservable (Section 3.2), the marginal
(expected) benefit becomes Bunobsρ (θ, ρ) =
∫ θ
γθ
q¯(x)dx. On the other hand,
when investment is observable (Section 3.1), the marginal benefit is equal to
Bobsρ (θ, ρ) =
∫ θ1
θ
q¯ρρ(x)dx +
∫ θ
γθ
q¯ρ(x)dx + ρ
∫ θ
γθ
q¯ρρ(x)dx, as was presented in equa-
tion (35). By Corollary 1, q¯ρρ(.) < 0. We also have q¯
0(.) = q¯(.), by equations
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(20), (22), and (23). Thus, q¯ρ(.) ≤ q¯0(.) = q¯(.). These observations imply that
Bobsρ (θ, ρ) <
∫ θ
γθ
q¯(x)dx = Bunobsρ (θ, ρ). Since B
obs
ρ,ρ (θ, ρ) < 0 and B
unobs
ρ,ρ (θ, ρ) = 0
for all ρ ∈ [0, 1), none of the two marginal benefit curves is ever upward sloping.
On the other hand, irrespective of the observability of investment, we always have
Rρ,ρ(ρ, γ) > 0 for all ρ ∈ [0, 1), implying that the marginal cost curve is everywhere
upward sloping. Since ρ∗(θ) is found at the intersection of the marginal benefit
and the marginal cost curves, and since the curve Bobsρ (θ, .) everywhere lies below
Bunobsρ (θ, .), ρ
∗(θ) must be lower when investment is observable than when it is
unobservable. 
Proof of Proposition 7. Pick any θ ∈ (0, θ1]. Note that equation (56) is the first
order necessary condition pim,eρ (θ, ρ
m(θ)) = 0 for an interior solution to the problem
in (53). Assumptions 3 and 4 imply ρ∗(θ) > 0, since the left hand side of (56) is
always positive. On the other hand, Assumption 5 implies that ρ∗(θ) < 1. Finally,
Assumptions 2 and 6 together imply that Rρ(ρ
m(θ), γ) > R(ρm(θ), γ)/ρm(θ); so (52)
is satisfied at ρm(θ). Finally, given equation (55) and Assumption 6, it is obvious
that ρm(θ) satisfies the second-order condition and it is unique. 
Proof of Proposition 8. Pick any θ ∈ (0, θ1]. Since Assumptions 1-6 and 9-
[0] hold, Proposition 5 ensures that the optimal investment, ρ∗(θ), of the regulated
monopolist is unique, lies in (0,1), and satisfies equation (46). Also, since investment
is unobservable, the optimal regulatory policy is given by (13)-(16), by Assumption
1. First let α = 1. Then, q¯(x) = D(x) for all x ∈ (0, θ1]. It follows from (41) that
for all ρ ∈ [0, 1)
Bρ(θ, ρ) =
∫ θ
γθ
q¯(x)dx =
∫ θ
γθ
(D0 −D1x) dx = (1− γ)θ D
(
(1 + γ)θ
2
)
. (68)
So, Bρ(θ, ρ) = 2B
m
ρ (θ, ρ) for all ρ ∈ [0, 1). Using optimality conditions Bρ(θ, ρ∗(θ)) =
Rρ(ρ
∗(θ), γ) and Bmρ (θ, ρ
m(θ)) = Rρ(ρ
m(θ), γ), along with the fact Bρ,ρ(θ, ρ) =
Bmρ,ρ(θ, ρ) = 0 and Assumption 6, we can conclude that ρ
∗(θ) > ρm(θ). Now consider
α 6= 1. Since q¯(.) is continuous in α, Bρ(θ, ρ) will be continuous, too. Thus, the
proof for α = 1 will also be valid for all α ∈ [0, 1] sufficiently close to 1. 
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